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I. INTRODUCTION

Less than one year after the Clinton Administration's September 1993 release of its much publicized game plan for "reinventing
government,"' the Administration and Congress find themselves in
the midst of the reauthorization process for the federal Superfund
law, a statute that undoubtedly has engendered as much
criticism concerning government effectiveness and efficiency as
any other environmental law passed in this country

1. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING
A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS (Sept. 7, 1993) [hereinafter
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW]. For a more detailed discussion of the Clinton
Administration's reinventing government effort, see inra part 11.
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 ("CERCLA" or "Superfund"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992).
3. As John Gibbons, Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (formerly the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)) noted in the
forward to an OTA report on Superfund, "From its beginning, controversy has
surrounded Superfund, and the program has had to cope with an unusually
high level of public scrutiny, criticism, and debate." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. OTA-ITE-433, COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND
PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED, at iii (Oct. 1989) [hereinafter COMING CLEAN]. J.
William Futrell, Environmental Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Codes of Professional
Responsibility, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 825, 832 (1994) (labeling Superfund "the
most controversial of the environmental statutes").
For an extensive list of materials that criticize one or more features of
the federal Superfund program, see David L. Markell, 77Te Federal Supefund
Program:Proposalsfor Strengthening the Federal/State Relationship, 18 WM. &
MARY J. ENVTL. L. 1, 16 n.38 (1993). Some of the titles of the materials that
criticize the federal Superfund program are noteworthy for their creativity. See,
e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Supeifund: EPA Success, National Debacle?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1992, at 11 (Elliott is a Professor at Yale Law School
and former EPA General Counsel); Alfred R. Light, Illuminating Irrationality:
Se~f-Deception and Supeifund Litigation, 24 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 722 (Nov.
11, 1992); Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, The Taming of the EPA,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1993, at 3.
No doubt a key reason for the level of criticism that CERCLA has endured over its fourteen year existence is that it has proved to be a "high
stakes game;" current estimates are that the cost of cleaning up a single site
averages $29 million, while the upper range estimate of the cost of cleaning up
all of the Superfund sites that need remediation is $1 trillion. Markell, supra,
at 14-15 & n.36.
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This article examines the ongoing Superfund reauthorization
efforts within the framework provided by the Clinton
Administration's work on "reinventing government."4 It uses the
most recently approved Senate version of the Superfund Reform
Act of 1994 (SRA) as the vehicle for analyzing the extent to
which the "intergovernmental relations" features of the SRA are
consistent with three techniques of good government that the reinventing government reports endorse: 1) streamlining decision
making processes to maximize efficiency and minimize duplication
of effort; 2) empowering implementers; and 3) encouraging
creativity.'

4. See NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1; infra part I. A
broader topic that I do not address in this article involves analyzing whether it
is possible within our democratic system to translate clear principles such as
those articulated in the National Performance Review into legislation, given the
"horse trading" and "special interest" politics that are endemic to our political
process. A related question is the degree to which a report such as the
National Performance Review, especially to the extent it is considered to be
nonpartisan and its principles widely endorsed, perhaps may serve in the future
as a "filter" for framing or setting the parameters for the legislative debate,
particularly on the "process" side (i.e., not what should be done, but how it
should be done-e.g., where should authority be vested, the tools and flexibility to be given to the implementers, and the nature of oversight), recognizing
that it is not possible to separate "process and substance" entirely. The National Performance Review itself suggests that the "movement to reinvent government" is non-partisan. Id. at 6.
5. The Superfund Reform Act of 1994, S. 1834, 193d Cong., 2d Sess. (June
17, 1994 ver.) (currently before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works) [hereinafter SRA]. Although this article specifically analyzes S. 1834, its
suggestions for reshaping Superfund apply to all reauthorization efforts. Currently, the House is working on its own version of the Superfund Reform Act
of 1994. H.R. 3800 was approved on May 18, 1994 by the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce and on July 28, 1994 by the House Comm. on Public
Works and Transportation. See Superfund: Momentum for Reforming Law
Continues; House Committee Unanimously Approves Bill, 25 Environment Reporter (BNA) 117, 117 (May 20, 1994). The Senate Subcomm. on Superfund,
Recycling, and Solid Waste of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works approved the current version of S. 1834 by a party line vote on June
14, 1994. Superfund: Senate Reform Bill Close to House Version; Negotiated
Rule-Making Provisions Eliminated, 25 Environment Reporter (BNA) 300, 300
(June 17, 1994).
6. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS; CREATING
A GOVERNMENT TtiAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (Sept
7, 1993) [hereinafter NPR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY). The National Performance
Review identifies four basic or overarching principles: 1) "cutting red tape;" 2)
"putting customers first;" 3) "empowering employees;" and 4) "cutting back to
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The SRA's approach to intergovernmental relations between
the federal and state governments reflects a considerable degree
of schizophrenia on the part of Congress and the Administration.
Congress and the Administration cannot make up their
mind-they want states to be more involved in the program, but
they do not fully trust states to perform well on their own.
Because of this underlying lack of confidence in states, the SRA's
structure for such intergovernmental relations squarely conflicts
with the reinventing government principles: it creates a significant
amount of duplication of effort in the form of site-specific federal
oversight of state performance; it limits the tools states have to
perform their responsibilities; and it dramatically curtails states'
flexibility to perform these responsibilities in the manner they
believe will be most effective.
The SRA's approach to intergovernmental relations within the
federal government similarly appears to be based on a residual
lack of confidence in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and an apparent preference for a largely centralized rather than
decentralized decision-making structure, especially in the enforcement, settlement, and allocation of responsibility arenas.7 In all

basics." NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, suppra note 1, at 6-7. As the Review
notes, these four principles are very closely linked. Id. The Review defines
these four overarching principles to include a number of sub-principles. For
example, the principle "cutting red tape" includes a series of related sub-goals
including creating systems that focus on results, not adherence to process;
reorienting systems to be proactive and prevent problems rather than simply
punish those who make mistakes; and stripping away unnecessary layers of
regulation that stifle innovation. Id. at 6-7. The Review's four overarching
principles embrace the four principles discussed in this article, although they
do not correspond precisely. Thus, the Review's themes of "cutting back to
basics," which the Review defines in part as producing better government for
less, and "empowering employees," both encompass the principles of "eliminating duplication," as does the Review's theme of "cutting red tape." The
Review's theme of "empowering employees" encompasses the concept of
.empowering implementers." Id. The Review's theme of "cutting red tape,"
which the Review defines in part as encouraging creativity by adopting systems
that are "accountable for achieving results," not systems in which "people are
accountable for following rules," embraces the concept of "encouraging creativity." Finally, the Review's "putting the customer first" principle covers the idea
of "customer satisfaction." Id. See also infra notes 16-18.
7. While Congress has acted incrementally in recent years to decentralize
a variety of environmental programs, the structure of many such programs
continues to require centralized involvement. See, e.g., itnfru note 98.
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three of these areas, the SRA runs counter to the reinventing government principles, creating redundancy between EPA and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and a lack of EPA empowerment by
giving DOJ a sign-off on EPA decisions.
The supreme irony is that Superfund reauthorization provides
the Administration and the Congress with their first opportunity to
craft legislation that embodies the recently issued reinventing
government principles. They largely have failed to rise to the challenge. After briefly summarizing the reinventing government principles, the remainder of this article evaluates the SRA in light of
these principles. It also offers alternative approaches to intergovernmental relations in the Superfund program that will produce
much greater adherence to the reinventing government principles.
If adopted, these alternative approaches also simultaneously will
address at least some of the underlying concerns that are responsible for the SRA's current structure, including the apparent lack
of confidence in the states.
II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF
THE "REINVENTING GOVERNMENT" REPORT

One of the much-publicized objectives of the current Administration has been to "reinvent government" with the goal of
making it operate more effectively.8 On March 3, 1993, President
Clinton announced his "National Performance Review," an initiative to determine how best to "mov[e] from red tape to results to
create a government that works better and costs less."9 In
announcing this initiative President Clinton stated:
Our goal is to make the entire federal government both less
expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of our
national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement
toward initiative and empowerment. We intend to redesign, to
reinvent, to reinvigorate the entire national government.' o

8. See NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1.
9. NPR EXECtrvE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 2.
10. Id. at inside cover.
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President Clinton assigned Vice President Gore to lead this
Review." Six months later, on September 7, 1993, Vice President
Gore released the Administration's Reinventing Government
Report,'2 as well as a series of accompanying reports that
address specific aspects of federal government operations,
including environmental issues."
In addition to the reports produced by Vice President Gore's
team, this national effort included "Reinvention Teams" within
each agency, including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)." EPA conducted an "internal National Performance
Review" and issued its own Phase I and II reports.'5
Among other principles, the National Performance Review
adopted the following three axioms for "changing government" to
make it more responsive and effective: 1) "eliminating duplication"
of effort;' 2) empowering implementers by "decentraliz[ing]
authority and empower[ingj those who work on the front lines to
make more of their own decisions and solve more of their own
problems";" and 3) encouraging creativity or "entrepreneurship."'8

11. Id. at 1.
12. See supra note 1.
13. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW (Sept. 7,

1993) [hereinafter REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT].
14. Id. at 1.
15. See EPA, PUB. No. EPA/210-R-93-004, CREATING A U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY THAT WORKS BETrER AND COSTS LESS, PHASE I REPORT NA-

TIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter EPA PHASE I REPORT];
EPA, PUB No. EPA/210-R-93-005, CREATING A U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS, PHASE II REPORT NATIONAL PER-

FORMANCE REVIEW (Dec. 1993).
16. See, e.g., NPR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 1, 2 (including
"eliminat[ing] duplication," "reduc[ing] waste" and "eliminat[ing] obsolete functions" as part of the "reinventing government" mission); NATIONAL PERFORMANCE
REVIEW, supra note 2, at 2 (The recommendations in the Report will "reduce
waste, eliminate unneeded bureaucracy,... and create a leaner but more
productive government.").
17. NPR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 2; NATIONAL PERFORMANCE
REVIEW, supra note

1, at 13, 14; REINVENTING

ENVIRONMENTAL

MANAGEMENT,

supra note 12, at 5.
18. NPR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 13 ("we must create a culture of public entrepreneurship-of people willing to innovate"); REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 12, at 3, 5, 6. One strategy to achieve

REINVENTING SUPERFUND

19941
III.

1061

MINIMIZING DUPLICATION OF EFFORT

This section evaluates the Superfund Reform Act of 1994 in
connection with the "reinventing government" principle that duplication should be eliminated. In significant respects, the SRA fails
to correct and, to some extent, exacerbates, deficiencies in
CERCLA in terms of this principle.
A. "MissionAccomplished" on the
"Cost Share"Front
At the outset in discussing the structural changes Congress is
proposing to Superfund in the context of intergovernmental relations, it is important to highlight one clear improvement that
Congress has wrought in the SRA. This improvement relates to the
change that the SRA makes in the allocation of costs to the
federal and state governments for sites that are cleaned up using
government funds. This change, if enacted into law, will reduce
duplication of effort and conflict between federal and state
sovereigns.
CERCLA currently creates a built-in potential conflict of
interest between the state and federal governments by giving them
inconsistent financial incentives concerning remedy selection.
CERCLA currently makes EPA responsible for ninety percent of
construction costs and zero percent of operation and maintenance
costs. " It thereby gives EPA a financial incentive to minimize the
cost of construction and maximize the cost of operation and maintenance.2" CERCLA gives states the opposite financial incentive,
making states responsible for ten percent of construction costs
and 100 percent of operation and maintenance costs.2 These
conflicting financial incentives give both governments a strong

this objective that the reinventing government reports allude to frequently is
that of "mov[ing] from measuring activities to measuring results." EPA PHASE I
REPORT, supra note 14, at 5; NPR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 2.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3). The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld this interpretation of CERCLA in response to a state
challenge. Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1543-15. (D.C. Cir. 1993).
20. Some EPA officials deny that they act on such incentives, while
several state officials disagree. Markell, supra note 3, at 60 & n.157.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9404(c)(3). Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d at 1543-46.
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incentive to participate in the remedial process for the same sites
in order to protect their unique financial interests. As I point out
in my October 1993 testimony before the House of
Representatives' Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous
Materials:
Because [CERCLA] creates this substantive potential for conflict,
this structure also leads to wasteful duplication of effort. States
have a strong financial incentive to participate actively in the cleanup process (even if EPA is participating actively as well) to produce
a remedy that has high construction costs and low 0 & M costs.
Further, states need to be involved at such sites to ensure that
EPA's financial incentives-which are the opposite of the
states'-do not drive EPA toward a remedy with low construction
costs and high 0 & M costs. Similarly, even if EPA were willing to
give a state the lead for a site ...

,

with the existing cost structure

EPA would need to be involved to ensure that the state acts in
EPA's best interests despite the different financial incentives of the
two governments. In sum, the federal government should create
level cost shares throughout the process for both the federal and
state governments to eliminate this potential source of conflict and
duplication of effort.'
To its credit, in the SRA Congress levels out the cost share for
fund-lead projects at eighty-five percent federal and fifteen percent
state for both construction and operation and maintenance costs
and thereby addresses what appears to be a significant cause of
the duplication of effort and conflict that sometimes characterizes
EPA/State relations under CERCLA.23

22. hbxliminary Hearings in Connection to Reauthorization of CERCLA
Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (Oct. 28,
1993) (statement of David L. Markell). Several state and federal officials share
my view that this potential financial conflict of interest causes "contentious debates" and frequent disputes between the governments concerning site-specific
remedies. Markell, supra note 3, at 61.
23. SRA, supra note 5, § 202, at 2-22 (creating CERCLA § 104(c)(ii)(A)).
"Fund-lead" is shorthand for cleanups paid for out of government funds. See
also Markell, supra note 3, at 59-63 ("Having a financial structure that creates
a different cost share for different parts of the process appears to be a major
source of tension between EPA and the states."). Other significant issues relating to government funding remain, including the ability of the federal and state
governments to bear their respective shares. Id. at 31-32, 62; Supeifund: Operation, Maintenance Costs by States Will Rise at 'Completed' Sites, GAO Says,
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B. Reasons to Be Less
Sanguine on the "DelegationFront"
Congress proposes to amend CERCLA by allowing states to
be delegated additional authority to handle sites.24 The effectiveness interms of minimizing duplication of this proposal is questionable. Two features of the current state/federal relationship
under CERCLA are salient here. First, while I may be overstating
the point somewhat, CERCLA and EPA's implementing regulations
in the National Contingency Plan (NCP)"5 essentially make the
federal Superfund process an EPA-run program with little opportunity for states to handle entire sites.26 For example, in the NCP,
EPA articulates its determination to make virtually all remedy
selection decisions, which are at the heart of the Superfund
process.27
Second, duplication of effort by the federal and state governments is commonplace under CERCLA's structure. CERCLA's
structure mandates that EPA provide states with the opportunity
for "substantial and meaningful involvement" at sites for which
EPA is in the lead.' Similarly, for those sites for which states
take a lead role, EPA legally is required to maintain substantial
involvement.' Because CERCLA's structure creates such built-in
overlap regardless of whether a state or EPA is in charge of a site,
this structure has caused many state and federal officials who
participate in the remedial process to complain that the current

24 Environment Reporter (BNA) 879 (Sept. 17, 1993) (discussing the high level
of O&M costs).
24. SRA, supra note 5, § 201 (creating CERCLA § 127).
25. 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1993).
26. Markell, supra note 3, at 38-39.
27. 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(e) (1993). The one exception to EPA's insistence
on retaining ultimate remedy selection authority involves non-Fund-financed
State-lead enforcement sites (i.e., sites that states will manage and for which
states will not require federal funds to accomplish remediation). 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.515(e)(2)(i). The number of federal NPL sites cleaned up under state
direction without federal funding appears to be extremely limited. Markell,
supra note 3, at 38 n. 103.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(0 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.500(a) (1993).
29. As discussed infra note 36 and accompanying text, EPA's "cooperative
agreement" mechanism for transferring the lead to a state for a site requires
EPA to remain substantially involved in that site.
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structure's provision for active federal and state involvement at
the same sites produces substantial duplication of effort "throughout the entire process.""
Given that the size of the hazardous waste cleanup problem
in this country dwarfs EPA's ability to address all of the sites that
need attention, a' the SRA appears to take a first step toward
leveraging federal resources and increasing the number of sites
handled by allowing capable and interested states to play a larger
role in the remediation process.32 For example, the SRA expressly authorizes EPA to delegate to states authority for fundamental
decisions such as "select[ing] a remedial action and issu[ing] a
record of decision."' In contrast, in the Preamble to the 1990
NCP, EPA states its view that it should retain such authority:
EPA believes, however, that it is not appropriate at this time to turn
over the final decision-making authority on remedy selection to
states .... EPA believes that it should retain primary responsibility
for the federal Superfund program.'
This new direction represents a marked potential expansion of the
state role at federal Superfund sites.

30. Markell, supra note 3, at 42.
31. COMING CLEAN, supra note 3, at 13 ("Superfund is just the visible tip
of an expanding national pyramid of cleanup programs."). EPA itself has concluded that the site remediation challenge is larger than EPA can handle on its
own:
EPA recognizes that many more sites need to be addressed than present
CERCLA resources can accommodate; by deferring some problem sites
to the States, EPA believes more overall response actions can be accomplished more quickly, and EPA can direct its resources to sites that
otherwise would not be addressed.
53 Fed. Reg. 51,394, 51,418 (Dec. 21, 1988) (proposed rule containing changes
to the NCP as a result of the SARA amendments). Some observers, however,
challenge the high priority that has been assigned to such sites. Keith Schneider, New View Calls Environmental Policy Misguided, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1993, at Al, A30.
32. See Markell, supra note 3, at 37-39.
33. SRA, supra note 5, § 201(a), at 2-3 (creating CERCLA
§ 127(a)(3)(A)(v)).
34. 55 Fed. Reg. 8783 (Mar. 8, 1990) (final rule revising the NCP); See also
supra note 27.
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The SRA's expansion of state responsibility, however, is
unlikely to achieve the reinventing government goal of minimizing
duplication or produce a significant boon to efficiency and productivity because Congress has decided not to match this decision
to encourage greater state involvement in addressing sites with a
decision to shift responsibility for such sites from EPA to the
states. Instead, Congress has decided to retain a *significant
federal, site-specific role even as to those sites which EPA delegates states the authority to address."5 Congress's choice of
"cooperative agreements" as the mechanism for EPA's delegating
responsibility to states reflects this decision. As the definition of
"cooperative agreement" makes clear, it is not a vehicle intended
for true transfers of authority from the federal to the state
government; instead it is a "partnership" vehicle-a "legal instrument EPA uses to transfer money ...to a recipient to accomplish
a public purpose in which substantial EPA involvement is
36
anticipated during the pefornance of the project."
Congress is reluctant to fundamentally restructure the
state/federal relationship by shifting from site-specific
"partnerships" to a new paradigm characterized by dividing
responsibility for specific sites between the two sovereigns
depending on their capabilities and interest. This reluctance
appears to stem both from the dynamics of the political debate
surrounding the Superfund reauthorization process and from
various studies of state Superfund programs. Environmentalists
have expressed apprehension about ceding "too much" power to
states. Senate testimony reflects this concern:
Citizens have extreme apprehension about states being delegated
authority for Superfund programs. We feel, in general, that if the
States had carried out their responsibilities to provide all citizens
with equal protection before the law with integrity and

35. See, e.g., SRA, supra note 5, § 201(a), at 2-1 (creating CERCLA §
127(a)(2)-(3)).
36. 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1993) (emphasis added). See also 40 C.F.R.
§ 35.6015(a)(14). In the SRA, as in CERCLA, Congress provides for the use of
both cooperative agreements and contracts. The former is used as the vehicle
to delegate authority to states. The latter is used primarily when EPA is in the
lead for a site to address cost share and other obligations that states have
under CERCLA. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.5, .500(b), .510(a), .515(a) (cooperative agreements); 40 C.F.R §§ 35.6800, .6805, 300.510(a) (contracts).
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commitment, there would be no Superfund. We therefore advocate
extreme caution in the delegation of Authority to States, and
judicious oversight by EPA in such cases."7

Studies issued by the General Accounting Office, the Office of
Technology Assessment, and EPA itself, among others, provide
additional support for Congress's questioning of state capability.'
The legislative outcome or product of these concerns about
state capabilities is Congress's compromise in the SRA of allowing
states to do more, but only with substantial EPA site-specific oversight. Unfortunately, this is a "halfway" gesture that will likely do
little to improve CERCLA in terms of the reinventing government
goal of minimizing duplication of effort. By failing to create a
"divorce" between state and federal players so that the governments divide sites and handle them largely independently, the SRA
continues the "two cooks in the kitchen" routine that has triggered considerable frustration in both governments. 9

37. Superfund: Hearings on S. 1834 Before the Senate Comm. on Environment And Public Works, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (June 28, 1994) (testimony
of Florence T. Robinson, North Baton Rouge Environmental Association and
The Communities At Large Network). Inclusion of this quote is not intended to
reflect the author's agreement with Ms. Robinson that Superfund would not be
necessary had states carried out their responsibilities properly. Instead, I have
included it as an example of citizens' concerns with ceding responsibility to
the states.
38. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-89-164, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES: STATE CLEANUP STATUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL
POLICY 3 (Aug. 1989); COMING CLEAN, supra note 3, at 13; OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, EPA, PUB. No. 9375.6-08B-PB92-963418, AN ANALYSIS
OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 1991 UPDATE (Dec. 1991)
[hereinafter 1991 50-STATE STUDY]. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, EPA, PUB No. EPA/540/8-91/002, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 1990 UPDATE (Sept. 1990) (hereinafter 1990 50-STATE
STUDY]. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, EPA, PUB. No.
EPA/540/8/89/011, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY

(Sept. 1989) [hereinafter 1989 50-STATE STUDY]. A fourth, 1993 version of EPA's
50-State Study, to be entitled "An Analysis of State Superfund Programs: 50State Study, 1993 Update," is due to be issued in August 1994, as EPA document no. 9375.6-08c, NTIS PB 94-963230. Telephone conversation with John
Pendergrass July 6, 1994. I have noted before that "[sitates differ dramatically
in their interest in doing Superfund work and in their ability to perform such
work." Markell, supra note 3, at 26.
39. Markell, supra note 3, at 42. Another observer uses the phrase "dual
masters" to make the same point regarding the current EPA/State relationship.
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One obvious alternative approach to addressing the
underlying concern about state capability that seems to be
partially responsible for the SRA's structure of substantial, sitespecific oversight, is for the federal government credibly to
address the issue of state capability at the initial decision point of
the process, by requiring meaningful demonstrations of capability
as a condition to delegation." The SRA actually already does this
to a significant extent. The SRA makes EPA the "gatekeeper" for
state participation as the lead agency in the federal Superfund
program. The SRA establishes rigorous criteria for EPA to follow
in considering delegating remedy selection and allocation
authority to states, providing that states must demonstrate as a
condition for such delegation 1) that they have "the capability to
select remedial actions or to apply the allocation procedures,
respectively, including adequate legal authority to enter into the
contract or cooperative agreement, financial and personnel
resources, organization, and expertise," and 2) "experience in ade-

See Supeifund Reform Act of 1994: Hearings on S. 1834 Before the Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (June 28,
1994) (testimony of Alan C. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, State of
Minnesota).
The proposed § 127(a)(4) requires EPA to delegate various types of
responsibilities to states upon the states' application for such authorities,
assuming that the state demonstrates its qualifications. SRA, supra note 5,
§ 201(a), at 2-4. The SRA's 'transition rules" qualify this seemingly mandatory
EPA obligation, especially for the vast majority of current National Priorities
List (NPL) sites, which are EPA lead sites. See SRA § 201(b), at 2-18. EPA is
the lead for 900 plus non-federal facility NPL sites while states serve as the
lead for slightly more that 200 such sites. EPA, CERCLIS database (June 1994).
Ultimately, these rules leave EPA enormous discretion for sites that already are
on the NPL. Cf. Steven M. Jawetz, The Supeifund Reform Act of 1994: Success
or Failure Is Within EPA's Sole Discretion, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,161, 10,163 (Apr. 1994). Due to these "transition rules," it is not clear how
many of the sites currently on the federal NPL will be delegated to states.
Sites that are not subject to state delegation will continue to be handled under
some variation of the current approach, with states retaining the ability to
participate in a substantial and meaningful way. SRA § 201(c), at 2-22 (creating
CERCLA § 121(f)(5)).
40. While the SRA currently provides for EPA to delegate federal authorities and responsibilities to states, rather than authorize states to exercise such
responsibilities using state authorities, the same principle of ensuring competence applies if Congress ultimately pursues an authorization approach. See
Markell, supra note 3, at 78 n.200 (explaining difference between authorization
and delegation).
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quately performing or ensuring the adequate performance of
similar response actions."4
Superfund is particularly amenable to the "high gate"
approach to state delegation that includes a showing of demonstrated state competence because most states have been operating
their own Superfund programs for several years and also have
participated in the federal Superfund program. As a result, EPA
has a considerable database with which to evaluate states' track
records.43 Further, unlike the situation for many programs, EPA
currently is largely implementing the Superfund program itself and
retains capacity to do so, so there is no compelling need to lower
4
the threshold for state certification.

41. SRA, supra note 5, § 201(a), at 2-6 (creating CERCLA § 127(c)(1),(2)).
See also id. at 2-4 (creating CERCLA § 127(a)(4)(B)).
The SRA fails to establish any criteria for delegation of other CERCLA
authorities, instead delegating this duty to EPA. Id. at 2-4, 2-5 (creating
CERCLA § 127(a)(4)(A), 127(b)). Congress should consider adding the same
required conditions for all activities that it authorizes EPA to delegate.
One question is whether EPA in requiring demonstrated state performance, should be satisfied by successful state performance under programs
that differ significantly from the federal approach, given the current requirement in the SRA that states must follow the NCP and EPA guidance. Id. at 2-6
(creating CERCLA § 127(d)); see infra part V. Intuitively, requiring a state to
demonstrate that EPA and the public at large can have confidence in the
state's ability to perform by the state's showing that it has performed successfully in the past, suggests that EPA should be wary of accepting state records
of successful past performance as indicators of future successful performance
if the programs under which the state operated in the past differ significantly
from the program under which it will be required to operate under CERCLA.
In such a case, past performance may not necessarily be a reliable indicator of
future performance. This concern is one more reason why Congress should
rethink requiring states slavishly to adhere to the NCP and EPA guidance, and
instead allow states to "innovate around" the statutory objectives.
The flip side of this question is whether Congress should keep the gate
high to states taking leadership roles but lower it somewhat by allowing states
to demonstrate their qualifications through proxies for actual proven competence, including financial and personnel resources, legal authority, enforcement
powers, etc. Markell, supra note 3, at 44 n.116 (listing several possible criteria). One partial safeguard in the SRA is its preserving EPA's right to act if a
site presents an imminent and substantial danger. SRA § 201(a), at 2-16 (creating CERCLA § 127(h)(1)).
42. See 1991 50-STATE STUDY, supra note 38.
43. See materials cited supra note 38.
44. EPA and the states collectively each have approximately 3500 people
working on Superfund issues. Markell, supra note 3, at 80 n.206.
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In sum, consistent with the National Performance Review,
Congress's objective in the SRA should be to establish federal and
state roles so as to "eliminate[] duplication,"" or at least minimize it. This reinventing government principle derives from the
notion that we simply cannot afford to have one set of bureaucrats (federal officials) spend a considerable portion of their
resources overseeing the activities of another set of bureaucrats
(state personnel), rather than performing their own work.
Congress's decision not to make states full and equal partners, but
instead to go only halfway towards true state empowerment by
requiring substantial EPA involvement in every site that states
address, likely will do little to achieve this goal of eliminating
duplication. It will require allocation of scarce federal government
resources to review the work of state officials rather than to work
on sites for which the federal government is responsible; and it
will require the allocation of scarce state resources to explain and
justify state actions to federal officials rather than performing
additional work. The result is likely to be frustration in terms of
achieving the objectives of minimizing duplication and leveraging
federal resources by expanding state responsibilities; state and
federal officials seeking to implement this scheme will continue to
be frustrated as well.
Instead, Congress should ensure that the gate for state accession to positions of site-specific leadership in the federal
Superfund program is high by sending a strong message to EPA
through the statutory language in the SRA and the legislative
history that EPA should be vigilant in its role as gatekeeper and
not act as a "rubber stamp" for states interested in participating in
the program. Sending such a strong signal should help to insulate
EPA from likely pressures to delegate. With the high barriers to
state entry that these measures will create, Congress's structure
should satisfy those who are skeptical of state prowess that only
truly capable states will be delegated authority to handle sites,
including having access to federal funds to address these sites. A
significant benefit to this approach in terms of the reinventing
government principle of eliminating duplication is that a structure
that is vigilant on the front end concomitantly should have less

45. NPR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 2.
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need for the redundant, site-specific federal oversight of state
performance that pervades the current SRA approach.
C. The Allocation Process
The structure that the SRA establishes for its allocation
process similarly appears to be in conflict with the reinventing
government principle of eliminating duplication of effort, explicitly
mandating redundant (actually "tridundant") government review
and resulting inefficiency.46 The SRA offers this new procedure
with the hope of encouraging settlements and reducing transaction
costs. Among other things, the SRA's allocation procedures appear
to be designed to streamline the Superfund process and to reduce
the likelihood of a "deep pocket" approach to litigation, by
allowing responsible parties to settle basically for their "share" of
liability as determined by a neutral allocator and approved by the
government and then barring contribution actions.47
1.

Opportunitiesfor State/Federal
Duplication and Conflict

As part of the theme of delegating responsibility to states, the
SRA authorizes EPA to delegate to a state the responsibility to
conduct the allocation of responsibility among responsible
parties.48 This allocation process essentially consists of six
phases:4 1) the government identifies the responsible parties
subject to the allocation process;' 2) a "neutral allocator" is

46. Proposed §§ 127 & 129 are the primary amendments that address the
allocation issue. SRA, supra note 5, § 201 (creating CERCLA § 127; § 409, at
4-47 (creating CERCLA § 129). As discussed in more detail below, government
"tridundancy" might be a more apt word than mere redundancy to describe
intergovernmental relations concerning the allocation process. "Tridundancy," a
word suggested to me by an EPA attorney, involves review of a decision by
three, not merely two, different government agencies.
47. This description is an oversimplification of the process that occupies
50 pages of the SRA bill. See SRA, supra note 5, § 409, at 4-47 to 4-97.
48. Id. § 201(a), at 2-9 (creating § 127(f)(2)(B)) (states can conduct allocation; § 409, at 4-47 (creating § 129) (authorizing the allocation process).

49. SRA, supra note 5, at 4-66. Again, this six phase summary is a simplification of the actual process.
50. SRA, supra note 5, § 409, at 4-52 (creating CERCLA § 129(c)).

19941

REINVENTING SUPERFUND

1071

retained;5 3) the allocator conducts an allocation process, in
which, inter alia,the allocator provides the parties with an opportunity to be heard either orally or in writing;52 4) the allocator
issues a draft report creating a "non-binding equitable allocation of
the percentage shares of responsibility of all allocation parties";'
5) the parties have an opportunity to comment on the report;5
and 6) the allocator issues a final report assigning shares of
responsibility.55 As part of the analysis, the allocator is empowered to assign an "orphan share," which then will be paid by the
federal and state governments (with the former bearing 85 percent
of this share and the latter bearing the remaining 15 percent).3
The SRA circumscribes the allocator's flexibility in assigning
shares in general, and in assigning an orphan share in particular,
by establishing a series of factors for the allocator to consider in
assigning shares, and by defining the concept of "orphan share."57
Once the allocator issues a final report, it is the government's
turn. If a state has been delegated authority to handle the site,
including the enforcement activities and the allocation, the state
has the option to reject the allocator's report, under limited conditions,' or to accept it. If the state accepts the report, it is
required to use the report as the basis for any settlements it
negotiates under the SRA.59
Although the SRA allows states to assume responsibility for
reviewing the allocator's report, Congress still retains a sitespecific role for the federal government to play in the allocation
process. If a state accepts an allocation report that contains an
orphan share as the basis for a settlement, the state shall apply
for federal funding of the federal share of the orphan fund by
certifying to EPA and DOJ that 1) the allocation is reasonable; and

51. Id. at 4-62 (§ 129(e)); id. at 4-58 (§ 129(c)(6)(B)).
52. Id. at 4-68 to 4-69 (§ 129(h)(3)).
53. Id. at 4-66 (creating § 129(h)(1); Id. at 4-69 (creating § 129(h)(4)) (orphan share).
54. Id. at 4-69 (§ 129(h)(3)).
55. Id. at 4-66 (creating § 129(h)(1).
56. Id. § 202, at 2-22 (creating CERCLA § 104(c)(11)(A). The orphan share
is defined in SRA § 409, at 4-69 (creating § 129(h)(4)).
57. Id. § 409, at 4-67 (creating § 129(h)(2)) (factors); Id. at 4-69 (creating
§ 129(h)(4)) (orphan share). See also § 201(a), at 2-8 (creating § 127(0(2)).

58. Id. § 201(a), at 2-10 (creating § 127(f)(2)(c)).
59. Id.
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2) assigning an orphan share is consistent with the statutory standards in section 129(h)(4).' EPA and DOJ must accept a state's
request for an orphan share unless they determine within 120 days
that the orphan share allocation does not meet the section
129(h)(4) standards."' The SRA prescribes that the federal government shall use a deferential standard in reviewing such
certifications, authorizing the government to reject an allocator's
report only when the allocation was irrational or affected by bias
or fraud. 2 Finally, Congress provides expressly that federal
authority to review such certifications shall not be delegated
below the Assistant Secretary level.'

60. Id. at 2-10 (creating § 127(f)(2)(E)). The requirement that both EPA
and DOJ review state decisions on allocations is an instance of
"tridundancy"-a more extreme manifestation of the problem of redundancy.
61. Id. at 2-11 (creating § 127(f)(2)(F)).
62. Id. § 409, at 4-78 to 4-79 (creating § 1290)).
63. Congress provides that federal acceptance of the allocator's report is
non-delegable:
No such determination [as to whether to accept the allocator's report]
may be delegated to any officer or employee of the Environmental Protection Agency or the Department of Justice below the level of an Assistant Secretary or Acting Assistant Secretary with authority for implementing this Act at the Environmental Protection Agency or the Department of Justice.
Id. at 4-79 (creating § 1290)). While EPA does not have Secretaries in its organizational structure, EPA's counterpart is likely to be the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA) or the
Assistant Administrator for the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
(OSWER). These are extremely high-level political appointee positions within
the agency's bureaucracy. Placing approval authority at this level means that
any allocation will need to go not only through the EPA regional office that in
theory will have been providing support to the state handling a particular site,
but also through the EPA Headquarters bureaucracy. This high level of
oversight seems curious. First, EPA Headquarters review is not required for the
vast majority of Records of Decision (RODs) issued by the Regional Offices,
each of which potentially may commit millions or tens of millions of dollars of
federal Superfund dollars to site remediation. See Markell, supra note 3, at 47
n.117. From a financial standpoint, it is not clear why regional oversight of site
allocation decisions would be inadequate. If Congress's concern is that the
newness of the process warrants heightened, multiple reviews at the outset, it
is unclear why such heightened review must persist. Creating such heightened
review is directly inconsistent with the concept of minimizing duplication (and
with the principle of empowerment discussed below).
In an anecdote, the National Performance Review applauds a National
Forest Service initiative that streamlined process by moving in precisely the
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Overall, it is possible to make the following observations concerning state/federal duplication in the allocation process. First,
structurally the process that the SRA creates is one of site-specific
review and approval by the federal government of state decisions.
That is, every neutral allocator's decision that involves an orphan
share and passes state muster also must be reviewed by, and pass
muster with, high ranking federal officials.' Such a structure
inherently produces rather than discourages redundancy. Second,
while Congress appears to have attempted to circumscribe the
federal government's role somewhat in order to minimize this
problem, through its limitations on the nature of the federal
government's review and its limited time frame for review, as well
as through the use of a state certification process,' it is not
promising that Congress has created review roles for two federal
agencies rather than one. It similarly is not encouraging that
Congress expressly prescribes that approval of state certifications
must occur at extremely high levels of both federal
agencies-officials at such high levels are likely to require
extensive briefings before signing off on state decisions.
Congress has the best of intentions in creating this multiple
review structure of the allocator's efforts. As the Administration

opposite direction from that reflected in the SRA-that is, it enabled employees
to grant permits themselves rather than process them through Headquarters.
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 6. The SRA's approach requiring high level federal review of allocation decisions, in short, appears to be
directly contrary to the idea in the National Performance Review Report that
"[w]orking toward a quality government means reducing the power of headquarters vis-a-vis field operations." NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note
1, at 70.
64. Consistent with this structure of maintaining a federal role while allowing front line responsibility to devolve to the states, the SRA also provides that
"EPA may "assign ... any responsibilities to conduct the allocation, except
that the Administrator and Attorney General shall retain their authority relating
to orphan share funding .

.

. , including the timing and terms of payment."

SRA, supra note 5, § 201(a), at 2-9 (creating § 127(f)(2)(B)). The SRA also
provides explicitly that even though EPA delegates responsibility for a site to a
state, EPA and DOJ are free to participate in the same process which the
state has expressed interest in handling, and which the federal government has
deemed the state competent to handle, providing that "[tlhe President, through
either the Administrator or the Attorney General, or both, may participate in
any phase of an allocation proceeding where an orphan share is identified." Id.
at 2-10 (creating CERCLA § 127(f)(2)(D)).
65. See supra part III.B.
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notes in its National Performance Review in discussing the existence of review and approval type procedures generally, "not one
inch of that red tape appears by accident. In fact, the government
creates it all with the best of intentions."' Congress's decision to
maintain both federal and state roles in the case-specific allocation review process undoubtedly stems from its concern that the
federal fisc be protected. Remember that an allocator has the
flexibility to assign an "orphan share," 85 percent of which
ultimately will be paid from federal coffers."7
It nevertheless seems clear that Congress should be able to
better balance this fiscal concern with the reinventing government
principle of minimizing duplication. If Congress is unwilling
because of a felt need to maintain federal involvement to protect
the public fisc to adopt the "divide the universe" structure that
will minimize duplication, Congress has at least two other options.
First, incrementally, Congress should simplify the nature of federal
oversight by limiting it to one federal bureaucracy. Further,
Congress should allow this federal oversight role to be "delegated
down" over time if not initially.
In a more radical departure from the SRA, Congress should
consider approaches such as 1) setting "trigger limits" that confine
federal review to orphan share allocations above a certain dollar
amount; and/or 2) a structure that has more of a programmatic
focus and entails EPA and the states managing the fiscal issues up
front, by authorizing EPA to give each capable state an orphan
share budget and then giving each such state flexibility in deciding
how best to use this fund to achieve mutually agreed upon
objectives (e.g., the maximum number of cleanups or the
maximum reduction in risk). Other options undoubtedly are
available as well. The abiding principle that should influence
Congress's consideration of these options is that in addressing the

66. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 11. Here, the duplication of effort and red tape created by this review process for the allocator's
decision is likely to be significant. At least three government bureaucracies and
up to six will review this decision. At the state level, at least one and perhaps
two agencies will be involved, the regulatory agency and perhaps the Attorney
General's office. At the federal level, up to four bureaucracies will review the
decision: the EPA regional office, the EPA Headquarters office, the local U.S.
Attorney's office if it is the DOJ lead for a site and the main DOJ office.
67. See supra note 67.
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need to protect the public fisc, the structure Congress creates
should address this concern in a way that minimizes duplication
of effort, especially the "second guessing," site-specific variety,
and maximizes the realization of other reinventing government
principles discussed in Sections IV and V below, empowering the
front lines personnel and encouraging their being creative or
entrepreneurial in accomplishing mutually agreed upon goals.
2.

Opportunitiesfor Duplication
and Conflict Between FederalActors

As indicated above, the SRA's newly proposed allocation
process gives states that take lead responsibility for sites little
autonomy, instead requiring that state allocation of responsibility
decisions be reviewed ankd approved by both EPA and DOJ.'
Congress unfortunately is consistent and does not allow EPA, for
sites for which it is in the lead, unilaterally to make the decision
as to whether to accept an allocation decision. Instead, again it
builds in a site-specific second-guessing role for DOJ, effectively
giving DOJ veto power over EPA's judgment.' Even EPA's ability
to establish internal guidance relating to the allocation process is
constrained by its obligation to "consult" with the Department of
Justice. 0 In sum, the SRA's allocation structure, which provides
for multiple federal bureaucracies to perform the same function
(i.e., reviewing allocators' decisions) appears to be directly
contrary to the basic objective of eliminating duplication of effort.
Congress's decision to maintain such a clearly inefficient
structure in order to limit EPA's autonomy may stem from its
dissatisfaction with EPA's performance during the early Superfund
years. The following statement by former Representative Florio,
one of the principal congressional authors of CERCLA, is representative of such dissatisfaction:
Congress set ambitious goals for the Superfund program;... Notwithstanding the optimistic language in the statute, no one expected

68. See supra note 66.
69. SRA, supra note 5, § 409, at 4-78 (creating CERCLA § 129(1)).
70. Id. at 4-95 (creating § 129(s)) (EPA, "after consultation with the Attorney. General, may promulgate rules (or guidance) of Environmental Protection
Agency organization, procedure, and practices.").
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a perfect agency response free of the false starts and delays normal
for any bureaucratic undertaking .... But, Congress did expect an
all out effort to attack the problem. Instead, Congress got long
explanations of technical and legal problems, and after five years
and over $1.6 billion, EPA could not identify a single site it had
completely cleaned up.7
To the extent that Congress retains a residual distrust of EPA's
ability to conduct allocations (or to settle cases or conduct
enforcement), 2 Superfund reauthorization offers Congress an
opportunity to address its concerns. The SRA's fix to this distrust
of EPA-requiring outside agency review and approval of EPA's
decisions-runs directly contrary to the reinventing government
principles. Instead, Congress should "fix the problem" in the
agency, and then empower it to carry out its responsibilities without imposing duplicative review by DOJ.73
D. Settling Cases
The SRA loosens somewhat, but ultimately maintains,
CERCLA's constraints on EPA's authority to settle cases unilaterally.' It maintains redundancy between EPA's and DOJ's roles

71. James J. Florio, Symposium, Foreword: Superfund and Hazardous
Wastes, 6 STAN. ENvTL. J. 2, 5 (1987). See also Markell, supra note 3, at 58.
This lack of confidence dates back to even before Superfund became law,
when Rep. Stockman worried about giving EPA too much power with an
"open-ended enabling statute that makes EPA the czar." 126 Cong. Rec. H9439
(daily ed. Sep. 23, 1950), reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 155
(Helen C. Needham & Mark Menefee eds., Envtl. L Inst. 1983).
72. See infra part III.D-E.
73. Refashioning DOJ's role in this respect would make DOJ's role much
more analogous to that of a traditional outside counsel. The "fragmented
nature of environmental policy making" extends beyond Superfund. Richard J.
Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection Into Legal Rules and the
Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 Loy. LA. L REv. 867, 876 (1994).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2). The SRA maintains a significant DOJ role in
reviewing EPA-negotiated and approved settlements but limits DOJs role
somewhat by allowing EPA to finalize such settlements without DOJ review
and approval at facilities where the total response costs are less than $5 million (CERCLA's current limit is $500,000). Even with the SRA's higher ceiling,
EPA will need to obtain DOJ's approval to finalize a settlement for most sites.
Letter from Elliott P. Laws, Assistant Administrator, EPA, to Al Swift, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials 18 (Jan. 26,
1994) (on file with author). The same issues apply to state efforts to settle at

19941

REINVENTING SUPERFUND

1077

that is analogous to the redundancy created in the allocation
process discussed above.7" EPA continues to lack the authority to
unilaterally-that is, without DOJ approval-settle cases regarding
remedial action commitments, except in limited situations. 6
Based on relatively limited legislative history on the issue,
Congress's decision to create a structure with such built-in redundancy appears to stem from four primary concerns with giving
EPA autonomy. First, Congress's confidence in EPA appears to be
less than complete. In part, as noted above," this appears to be a
carryover from the early days of the Superfund program. EPA's
performance during this early period of the program has been
widely criticized. During the 1986 Congressional debates
concerning amending CERCLA, several Senators echoed the
concern with EPA's performance that Congressman Florio articulated. Senator Mitchell, for example, discussed the "sweetheart
deals that EPA negotiated with PRP's several years ago. " '

sites where response costs exceed $5,000,000. Under SRA's proposed revisions
to § 122(h)(1), states will be required to obtain DOJ approval of all such settlements as well. SRA, supra note 5, § 408(6)(B)(iii), at 4-47 (amending
CERCLA § 122(h)(1)). As one commentator notes,
This is likely to cause substantial friction in the always delicate relationship between state and federal environmental enforcement officials.
States typically litigate and settle their cases under their own sovereign
powers without any involvement by the federal government, and thus
can be expected to chafe whenever their autonomy is lessened, as it
would be by being required to ask DOJ to approve each settlement.
Fax from John Pendergrass, Senior Attorney and Director, Center for State,
Local and Regional Environmental Programs, Environmental Law Institute (July
6, 1994) (on file with author).
75. See supra part III.C.
76. SRA, supra note 5, § 408(5)(D), at 4-46 (amending CERCLA § 122(g)).
See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(a), (g) (current law).
77. See Florio, supra note 71, and accompanying text.
78. 132 Cong. Rec. S14,918 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Mitchell), reprinted in 2 TE SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORIZATION
ACT Op 1986: THE LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, at "Senate Conf. Debate" (Scott C.
Clarkson, Inst. of Law and Public Health Protection & James W. LaMoreaux,
Envtl. Inst. for Waste Mgmt. Studies eds., Apr. 1987) [hereinafter SARA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. See also Sen. Simpson's discussion of the "cloud" under which
the program operated in its early years due to "the public problems of its
stewardship . . . " Id. at S14,921. As Professor Lazarus observes, Congressional
distrust of EPA extends well beyond the Superfund program. Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental
Law, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 311, 313; Richard J. Lazarus,
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Second, Congress's decision to include DOJ in the settlement
approval process also appears to have been influenced by a desire
to promote consistency nationwide as well as to provide a
"substantive check" on EPA by providing for review by the
"experienced hands" at DOJ. As the House Judiciary Committee
Report notes concerning the former issue, "centralized review and
oversight will also ensure that settlements of significant claims by
diverse agencies and regional offices will be consistent
nationally... ." Concerning the latter, the Report notes that
"evaluating large settlement proposals involves the consideration
of factors with which the Justice Department has had much experience, including the litigative risks of trying the case and the
possible precedential value of the case."' Third, Congress
appears to have incorporated DOJ review of settlements to ensure
that such settlements have no adverse effects on ongoing or
potential litigation.8 ' Finally, Congress appears to have wanted to
retain judicial review of settlements as an additional check on
EPA discretion and to provide a forum for public review of such
settlements; and Congress considered DOJ involvement in the
settlement process to be necessary to process cases through the
judicial system.'
A system of checks and balances such as that embodied by
DOJ review and approval of EPA settlements adds some degree of
value to the decision making process. At the same time, such a
system appears to be squarely in conflict with the reinventing
government principles of minimizing duplication and empowering
implementers. A strong argument exists that we no longer can
afford to address the lack of confidence or the desire for consistency concerns by creating duplicative review structures in the
context of settlements just as we no longer can afford to use
scarce government resources to conduct redundant reviews in the

The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet
Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 205, 214-19 ("EPA bashing has become commonplace
on Capitol Hill . .

").

79. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. REP. No. 253 To H.R. 2817, 99th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1985), reprinted in I SARA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 78, at 122-

57.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Statement of Sen. Mitchell, supra note 78.

19941

REINVENTING SUPERFUND

1079

allocation process. "[O]ne federal bureaucracy, or two bureaucracies if EPA Headquarters [as well as the EPA Regional Office] is
involved, should be capable of negotiating settlements .... "'
Consistent with the reinventing government principles, rather
than creating external, redundant, site-specific review, Congress
should create or require the creation of internal mechanisms at
EPA to promote consistency and substantive adequacy in settlements.' Congress should also use available mechanisms periodically to conduct programmatically-oriented reviews of EPA and
state performance in the settlement process.
Providing for DOJ review and approval of settlements in
order to enhance DOJ's ability to ensure that such settlements do
not adversely affect ongoing or potential litigation is a more difficult issue. Once a case concerning a particular site is filed in
court, DOJ involvement in settlements concerning the site, and
court approval of such settlements, appears appropriate. It is less
clear that DOJ involvement in settlements is necessary or appropriate for sites where litigation has not been initiated. Early settlements obviously have the potential to impact future litigation. The
same is true, however, with respect to every EPA decision,
foremost among them probably being the remedy selection
decision. Consequently, the existence of a relationship between a
settlement or some other site activity and potential subsequent
litigation by itself does not justify DOJ involvement in the earlier
activity. A more "reinventing government-friendly" approach,
again, is to create a settlement structure that minimizes the
likelihood that pre-litigation settlements will undermine such
litigation, and ensures that DOJ is aware of a site's pre-litigation
history, including any earlier settlements.'

83. Markell, supra note 3, at 58.
84. In fashioning this structure to include safeguards, Congress also should
be mindful of the two principles discussed in Sections IV and V, empowerment
and creativity. EPA's model consent decree is one example of an effort to promote institutional consistency.
85. Congress should determine whether it needs to create additional safeguards to compensate for minimizing DOJ's role. The SRA's settlement structure already creates considerable checks on EPA's ability to enter into settlements on terms that will undermine future litigation. Limitations on covenants
not to sue, the allocation process, the impact of settlements on the liability of
non-settlors, and other provisions seem to provide considerable assurance that
EPA will not "sell out" the government's interests in settlements. See SRA,
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Finally, better options exist for preserving both the "judicial
and public checks" on EPA settlements that appear to have played
some role in Congress's decision to involve DOJ in EPA Superfund
settlements. In the 1986 debates, Senator Mitchell explained that
one reason for requiring judicial review of settlements before they
were finalized was to create a judicial check on agency
settlements:
A court's authority to review consent decrees is not diminished or modified. There continues to be judicial review of these
decrees as a check on the agency's exercise of its discretionary
authority to enter into settlement agreements. The court can review
the decree to determine whether the decree is in the public
interest.m
Congressman Roe discussed the role of judicial review of settlements as a tool to give the public an opportunity to serve as a
check on EPA settlements through the public's chance to
comment on such settlements before they were finalized:
To avoid the so-called sweetheart deals which may occur if the
settlement process is abused, settlement agreements under the
section [122] must be entered as consent ... decrees and must be
open for public review and comment. 7
The nation's district court judges clearly do not need this
extra work. As Congress acknowledged in 1986 in allowing EPA to
settle a limited number of cases administratively, doing so "will
also help to reduce the number of cases filed in federal courts"
thereby saving overburdened judicial resources.' EPA's administrative judicial system provides an alternative forum for

supra note 5, § 406, at 4-26 (amending CERCLA § 113(0(2)); § 409, at 4-81
(creating § 129(o)); at 4-86 (creating § 129(p)); § 408(4), at 4-33 to 4-37
(amending § 122(0) (regarding covenants). The non-settlors' ability to participate in the settlement approval process and the provision for review and approval of the settlement by the judiciary provide further assurance against
EPA's producing such settlements on more than an anomalous basis.
86. Statement of Sen. Mitchell, supra note 78, at S14,918.
87. 132 Cong. Rec. H11,079, reprinted in 2 SARA LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY,
supra note 78, at "House Bill Debate."
88. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. REP No. 99-253, supra note 79, reprinted in 1
SARA LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, at 122-57.
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processing settlements that will accomplish Congress's goals of
providing 1) a judicial check on EPA settlements, and 2) a public
check on such settlements by allowing public comment on them,
without the negative aspects of the current system of requiring
redundant federal agency (i.e., DOJ) involvement in the settlement
process and exacerbating the overloading of an already overloaded federal court system.
EPA maintains an independent judicial system that it uses to
process administrative enforcement cases.' This administrative
judiciary includes Administrative Law Judges and an Environmental Appeals Board (Board or EAB). 9 The Board seems competent
to serve as an independent check on EPA-negotiated settlements
and to provide a forum for public review and comment on
proposed settlements for several reasons. First, the Board already
performs the job of finally approving settlements under a variety
of environmental programs, including the Toxic Substances
Control Act and the FIFRA 1 The Board has developed formal
procedures to govern its review and approval of such settlements.' Finally, the Board already is involved in Superfund
matters and therefore has substantive expertise in this area.'

89. Edward E. Reich, EPA's New Environmental Appeals Board, NR&E
Spring 1994, at 39, 39.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 40. Like Superfund agreements, such settlements may involve
remediation issues, though not of the scope typically raised in federal
Superfund cases.
92. Id. Environmental Appeals Board Consent Order Review Procedures
(Jan. 5, 1993) (internal memorandum, on file with author). While this procedure currently does not provide for public comment as part of the review
process, it could be changed to do so.
93. The Board very recently was given authority to resolve petitions for
reimbursement under CERCLA § 106(b). EPA, Superfund Program; Availability
of Guidance Document, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,465 (July 28, 1994). See also EPA Delegation of Authority CERCLA 14-27 (June 1994) (cited in id.). The EAB could
perform a similar function with respect to state-negotiated settlements. Alternatively, Congress could allow EPA to delegate this function as well to states
with similar administrative structures. Another option to ensure judicial review
while minimizing redundancy is to empower EPA to submit such settlements to
federal district court judges for their review and approval on its own, without
having to proceed through DOJ. The latter approach would require special
authorization within the statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988) (reserving representation of the federal government "[elxcept as otherwise authorized by law").
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In sum, Congress has alternative structures available to it to
achieve the goal of creating judicial and public review checks on
agency settlement authority that would entail far less redundancy
than occurs under the current structure.
E. Enforcement: ObtainingFines
and Other Sanctionsfor Non-Compliance
The SRA lands in the same conceptual trap concerning the
enforcement process as it falls into in the settlement arena,
creating considerable redundancy between states and DOJ and
between EPA and DOJ. As noted above, the SRA authorizes EPA
to delegate to states a wide variety of authorities, including enforcement authorities.' The SRA, however, later circumscribes
this authority, limiting a state's ability to take such enforcement
action unilaterally if the claim exceeds $300,000.' 5 Instead, the
state must obtain DOJ approval for state enforcement responses
in such instances.' The SRA creates the same limitations on
EPA's authority as it imposes on states if EPA is in the lead to
resolve enforcement actions, again requiring DOJ involvement in
such EPA-developed cases."7
The reinventing government principles, based on the idea that
we no longer can afford redundancy of government effort and
instead should be empowering implementers, suggest that in the
SRA Congress should decentralize the enforcement structure and
remove existing impediments to administrative enforcement action
by EPA and the states.9' This issue extends beyond the immediate scope of this article as well. This centralized approach to
enforcement is not unique to CERCLA among the environmental
statutes. Both the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act
expressly and dramatically limit EPA's administrative penalty
authority.' For example, the Clean Water Act authorizes civil

94. See supra part III.B.
95. SRA, supra note 5, § 408(6)(B)(ii), at 4-46 to 4-47 (amending CERCLA
§ 122(h)(1)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. At least one state has essentially parallel administrative and civil penalty authority with no artificial limits on administrative penalty authority. N.Y.
ENVrL. CONSERV. LAw Art. 71 (McKinney 1984 and Supp. 1994).

99. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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penalties of up to $25,000 per violation per day with no statutory
maximum."° It limits EPA's administrative penalty authority,
however, to cases involving penalties of no more $10,000 per day,
and limits the maximum administrative penalty to $125,000.101
The Clean Air Act similarly limits EPA's administrative penalty
authority compared to its civil authority."° The reinventing
government principles suggest that Congress should rethink the
federal government's centralized approach to enforcement. In
doing so, it will need to address the issue, what should be DOJ's
main role in an enforcement structure that conforms to these
principles.
F. Permit Waivers
In an example of its creating unnecessary process and the
unnecessary potential for conflict and duplication, Congress
declines in the SRA to treat states as EPA's equal for purposes of
granting exemptions from permitting requirements. Instead of
acting programmatically and making the decision that like EPA,
states should be exempt from permitting requirements, Congress
leaves this decision to EPA to address as part of the delegation
process.
One of the impediments that states have identified to their
handling Superfund sites involves the issue of whether they need
to obtain federal permits that otherwise would apply to the remedial activity." CERCLA currently exempts EPA from having to
obtain such permits,'" on the ground that the remedial process
is the functional equivalent of the permit process. In the federal
government's view, the remedial process provides adequate assurance of public participation and of consideration of environmental

100. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
101. Id § 1319(g).
102. The Clean Air Act authorizes civil penalties up to $25,000 per day for
each violation while establishing a ceiling of $200,000 for administrative
penalties. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d). With DOJs approval, EPA may pursue administrative penalty cases that exceed $200,000. Id.
103. Superfund Reform Act of 1994: Hearings on S. 1834 Before the Senate
Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess. 11 (June
28, 1994 (testimony of Alan C. Williams, Asst. Attorney General, State of Michigan) [hereinafter Williams Testimony).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e)(1) (1988).
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and health concerns in selecting a remedy; as a result, it has concluded that requiring EPA to proceed through a permit process
would be redundant and inefficient."°
The same analysis applies to states. This is particularly true
given the inflexibility that characterizes the SRA's framework for
delegating authority to states." The proposed section 127(d)
requires states, as a condition for being delegated authority to
select remedial actions, to "agree to select such remedial actions
in accordance with all of the procedures and requirements set
forth in sections 113, 117, and 121 of this Act, the national contingency plan, and any other relevant regulations issued and
guidelines adopted by the Administration." 7
Despite this, proposed section 127(e)(3) establishes a system
in which a state may avoid the redundant permitting requirements

105. As EPA notes in its preamble to the 1990 NCP:
CERCLA actions should not be delayed by time-consuming and
duplicative administrative requirements such as permitting, although the
remedies should achieve the substantive standards of applicable or relevant and appropriate laws . . . . EPA's approach is wholly consistent
with the overall goal of the Superfund program, to achieve expeditious
cleanups, and reflects an understanding of the uniqueness of the
CERCLA program, which directly impacts more than one medium (and
thus overlaps with a number of other regulatory and statutory programs). Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to formally subject
CERCLA response actions to the multitude of administrative requirements
of other federal and state offices and agencies.
55 Fed. Reg. 8756 (Mar. 8, 1990) (final rule revising the NCP).
See also Lawrence E. Starfield, The 1990 National Contingency
Plan-More Detail and More Structure, But Still a Balancing Act, 20 Envtl. L
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,222, 10,234 (June 1990) (The interpretation that cleanups need not comply with the administrative requirements of other laws "was
historically based on the position that CERCLA actions must be allowed to
proceed expeditiously and that compliance with administrative and procedural
provisions would slow down CERCLA actions. Moreover, the NCP sets out a
detailed set of procedures of its own that CERCLA actions must follow; these
render unnecessary the procedures of other environmental programs." (citations
omitted)).
106. Creating this inflexibility itself is inconsistent with the reinventing government theme, which is to develop objectives and then allow the "workers" to
act creatively to achieve them. See infra part V.
107. SRA, supra note 5, § 201(a), at 2-6 (creating CERCLA § 127(d)). Sections 113, 117, and 121 of CERCLA address administrative record, public participation, and cleanup standards issues, respectively. The NCP provides a detailed framework for implementing the statute.
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only "if expressly provided in the contract or cooperative agreement" that it enters into with EPA for the site."° It is premature
to speculate as to whether EPA routinely will include such
waivers in its delegations to states. It seems sensible, however, for
Congress to remove this possible issue from the EPA-State negotiating table, and provide explicitly that the permit waiver provision
covers EPA and state-lead response actions.
G. Summary
In sum, despite making some improvements to CERCLA, the
SRA fails materially to advance achievement of the reinventing
government goal of minimizing duplication. Instead, it mandates
site-specific redundancy of effort throughout the Superfund
process. Congress should take three actions in the SRA to
minimize duplication of effort. First, Congress should respond to
its apparent underlying lack of confidence in states by ensuring
that the gates to delegation do not swing open widely to admit
every state that expresses an interest. Instead, its legislative
structure should open these gates only to those states that have
shown that they are competent to handle the tasks for which they
are seeking delegation.
Second, as I pointed out in testimony before a House
Subcommittee, Congress should use Superfund reauthorization as
an opportunity to require EPA to develop tools for overseeing the
performance of delegated states primarily from a programmatic,
rather than a site-specific, perspective:
[T]he federal government should maximize its use of "creative
tools" such as public accountability, and minimize its use of the
traditional approach of case-specific, resource-intensive oversight of
state employees by their federal counterparts. Governments collectively need to improve in allocating the majority of their resources
to "field work," and in minimizing the percentage of their resources
that are involved in "oversight" functions. Congress could make a
contribution to good government that would transcend the
Superfund program by developing more effective and more efficient
ways for one governmental unit to monitor another's
performance. '"

108. Id. at 2-7 (creating § 127(e)(3)).
109. Markel Testimony, supra note 22, at 5-6. See also NATIONAL PERFOR-
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At a minimum, Congress should direct EPA to include the
following components in such a programmatically-oriented oversight scheme: 1) citizen review/oversight of state performance (the
issue of "customer satisfaction" with such performance)," ' 2)
EPA auditing of state performance designed to measure the
quality of overall state performance, and 3) substantive measures
of success designed primarily in terms of risk reduction, not
consistency with federal processes.
With respect to the, issue of "customer satisfaction" in particular, the SRA should create four vehicles to maximize the
opportunity for productive citizen review of state performance
under the Superfund program. First, it should empower citizens to
participate in the threshold "delegation" decision. Section 127 does
this."' Second, it should empower citizens to participate actively
in state-lead site-specific remediation efforts. Through Title I and
various sections of Title II, the SRA does this as well."2 Third,
the SRA should create a citizen suit mechanism that allows
citizens to initiate legal action in certain instances (e.g., if a
responsible party is violating the terms of its consent agreement
with the state, and the state has failed to take timely action to

MANCE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 35. The issue of sanctions for poor performance is another issue that Congress and EPA need to address. See Markell,
supra note 2, at 76 n.198, for a discussion of dissatisfaction with current sanctions.
110. The National Performance Review identifies customer satisfaction as a
basic principle. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 44.
111. SRA, supra note 5, § 201(a), at 2-4 to 2-5 (creating CERCLA §
127(a)(5)).
112. See id. at Titles I and II. The nature of the process that Title I of the

SRA creates concerning community involvement raises another set of questions
beyond the scope of this article relating to the impact of this bill, if it is
passed, on the government's ability to produce large numbers of site cleanups

in a timely fashion.
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require compliance). While the SRA provides for citizen suits,"3
its approach seems convoluted and should be reconsidered.
The SRA also should give citizens an ongoing right to
comment on the quality of state performance, both on a sitespecific basis and overall. New York State's State Superfund
Management Board, which is a statutorily-created citizen review
board of the State's Superfund program, is an example of one
mechanism that Congress should consider in determining how
best to increase citizen involvement, and more specifically,
citizens' role as "customers" and their functioning as program
reviewers." 4
Third and finally, Congress should rethink its position on the
appropriate role for the Department of Justice. Can we afford to
maintain a structure that mandates routine case-specific duplication of effort by EPA and DOJ? The SRA provides Congress with a
vehicle for fundamentally re-examining whether to retain a
"centralized" approach to settlement and enforcement issues or
whether to shift to a decentralized structure. The reinventing gov-

113. SRA, supra note 5, § 201(a), at 2-16 (creating § 127(g)(2)(D)). The
SRA currently provides for citizen suits against EPA if a state fails to comply
with a cooperative agreement. The SRA thereby appears to create a strong
incentive for active, site-specific EPA oversight of state activity, precisely the
type of oversight that is directly at odds with the reinventing government
principle of minimizing duplication of effort. Instead, Congress should
encourage site-specific citizen oversight that complements EPA's more
programmatically-oriented oversight, thereby further supporting a reduction in
detailed site-specific oversight of one government employee by another. Instead
of the current convoluted structure which allows citizens to sue EPA when
states misbehave, why not allow citizens to sue states directly, or pursue the
responsible parties directly if it is the responsible parties' malfeasance or
nonfeasance that is at the root of the problem?
114. See N.Y. ENVTL CONSERV. LAw § 27-1319 (McKinney Supp. 1994). The
SRA creates a "citizen governing board" to ensure that the "Citizen Information
and Access Offices (CIAO's)" that the SRA also creates are managed properly.
SPA, supra note 5, § 102, at 1-24 (creating § 117(h)(4)). The SA should follow New York's lead and create a statewide board to review the performance
of the state's overall Superfund program, not just the performance of the
CIAO's. In terms of the mission of such a Board, in addition to the guidance
that New York's and other states' efforts offer, the Board should conduct programmatic reviews of issues such as priority setting, response actions, and
public participation. Cf. id. at 1-29 (§ 117(i)) ("environmental justice" study
must include programmatic review of EPA or state performance).
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emnment principles suggest that the latter approach deserves
serious consideration.
IV. EMPOWERMENT
A second criticism of the SRA from the perspective of the
"reinventing government" credo is its failure to give states all of
the tools they need to be as effective as possible in performing
their job of securing expeditious cleanups, with responsible
parties funding the necessary work whenever possible. A key
component of the reinventing government reports is the idea of
"empowerment"-that is, giving "those who work on the front
lines" the authority "to solve more of their own problems.""' 5 As
the National Performance Review stated, "[w]e must give workers
the tools they need to get results ....""' The SRA is deficient in
this respect, because it expressly limits the authority that states
will have in performing their responsibilities.
The SRA fails to empower states by expressly preventing
EPA from empowering states to use one of CERCLA's most
powerful tools, section 106 injunctive authority."7 One theme of

115. NPR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 2.
116. Id. at 14.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). SRA § 201(a), at 2-4 (creating § 127(a)(3)(B)). See
also, New York v. Shore Realty 759 F.2d 1032, 1049 (2d Cir. 1985).
The SRA empowers EPA to delegate responsibility to states to conduct
a wide range of actions under the federal Superfund law, including 1) preliminary assessments/site investigations (PA/SI's), 2) hazard ranking system (HRS)
scoring, 3) remedial investigations and feasibility studies (RI/FS's), 4) non-time
critical removals, 5) records of decision (ROD's), 6) remedial designs, 7) remedial actions, 8) operation and maintenance (0 & M), 9) enforcement, and 10)
allocations.
SRA, supra note 5, § 201, at 2-2 to 2-4 (creating CERCLA
§ 127(a)(3)(A)(i)-(xi)). CERCLA already gives state authority to use § 107 authority to recover funds they spend.
In contrast, the SRA does not permit EPA to adopt the approach used
under the Clean Water Act and other statutes and authorize a state to handle
NPL sites under state authority. Instead, it directs EPA to "conduct a study of
the feasibility of authorizing States to use their own laws to carry out the
provisions of this Act in lieu of the Federal program established under this
Act." SRA, supra note 5, § 201(a), at 2-18 (creating CERCLA § 128). This is so
despite the completion of a series of studies since 1989 by the Environmental
Law Institute on state Superfund programs, including their legal authorities, and
their performances. See materials cited supra note 38. See also Markell, supra
note 3, at 78 n.200 (distinguishing delegation from authority).
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the SRA is that we are moving from a relationship in which states
play a support role through their opportunity for "substantial and
meaningful involvement" in EPA's process,1 '8 to a relationship in
which qualified states are encouraged to take the lead for sites.
Depriving states of section 106 injunctive authority is inconsistent
with the concept that states are to be allowed and encouraged to
take responsibility for addressing NPL sites. Such a limitation is
likely to backfire by significantly undermining states' ability to
effectively negotiate settlements or otherwise resolve cases
successfully due to their being prevented from using this powerful
enforcement tool."' It thereby will increase the need for federal
involvement in the state-lead cases or the need to use the federal
Superfund instead of private party funds to address such sites.

The State of Colorado argued that CERCLA § 121(e)(2) provides states
with injunctive authority. Colorado v. Idarado Mining Company, 916 F.2d 1486
(10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 960 (1991). The Tenth Circuit rejected
this argument. Id. Even if § 121(e)(2) provides states with such authority, it is
not nearly as powerful a tool as § 106 because inter alia § 121(e)(2) lacks a
treble damages provision.
118. See supra text accompanying note 28.
119. Several states have their own injunctive authorities. It is unlikely that
courts will construe the SRA to preempt states' ability to use such authorities.
Such authorities, however, do not necessarily compensate for, or justify, a decision not to give states § 106 authority. First, a structure that relies on a combination of federal and state authorities unnecessarily raises issues (e.g., the
ability to bring pendent claims) that will require judicial, government, and responsible party resources to resolve. Second, states' injunctive authorities in
many cases will not be as powerful as § 106 and thereby will give states less
leverage to perform their responsibilities than if they were delegated authority
to use § 106 injunctive authority. See, e.g., N.Y. ENrL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1313
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994) (providing the state with injunctive authority to
address Superfund sites, but not including § 106's unilateral or treble damages
tools as part of this authority). See David L. Markell & Dolores A. Tuohy,
Some Thoughts on Running a Supeifund Program: A State Perspective, NAT'L
ENvTL ENFORCEMENT J., Nov. 1990, at 3, 5. CERCLA's legislative history reflects
that states sought the ability to use § 106 injunctive authority. SUPERFUND: A
LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 71, at 152, 155-56.
One factor concerning delegating § 106 authority that complicates the
delegation issue, but should not be a basis for preventing delegation, is that
EPA shares such authority with DOJ. While EPA may issue unilateral administrative orders under § 106, it may invoke § 106 judicial authority only by
working with DOJ. Consequently, delegation needs to address the terms and
conditions for both the unilateral administrative and judicial exercise of this
authority.
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The likely reason for the decision not to allow states to use
section 106 authority is that the federal government is concerned
that states will produce adverse section 106 case law if they are
given this authority.'2 ° The federal government, however, cannot
afford to let this fear control policy in this way. Again, it makes
little sense simultaneously to expand states' responsibilities, while
undermining states' ability to fulfill them successfully by limiting
states' authority.'2'
If the federal government is serious about ceding responsibility for some NPL sites to states, it is contrary to its "reinventing
government" principles and likely to be counterproductive to limit
the weapons in the states' arsenal.
V.

ENCOURAGING CREATIVITY

It is widely recognized that states serve as valuable
laboratories for experimentation in our federal system and that
encouraging such behavior offers significant benefits. As Justice
Brandeis noted in his famous dissent in 1932 in New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, "[iut is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,

120. Markell, supra note 3, at 44 n.116.
121. This is particularly true since there appears to be little basis for this
apparent lack of federal confidence in states' ability to create good case law.
States have had the authority to use § 107 liability since CERCLA's inception
in 1980. One of the most favorable § 107 precedents was established through
state litigation in the PiciUo case. O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (lst Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990). Further, as occurred in New York v.
General Electric Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), the United States
through DOJ may participate as amicus curiae in significant state cases. In that
case, the court allowed the United States to submit a memorandum of law
supporting the State. As the court pointed out in describing the United States'
interest in the State's litigation under CERCLA
"The interest of the United States is described in that memorandum as
twofold: First, the United States relies to a great extent on the response
of states to the wide-spread problems generated by the disposal of hazardous wastes. Second, the United States is vitally interested in the outcome of actions brought under CERCLA to the extent that its own
CERCLA actions may be affected by any adverse rulings."
Id. at 294 n.7. Establishing the federal government's right to intervene in all
state cases appears to be a reasonable step to minimize concerns associated
with delegating states § 106 authority. The SRA would allow intervention as
of right. SRA, supra note 5, § 201(a), at 2-17 (creating CERCLA § 127(i)).
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serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.""2 A recent
Environmental Law Institute (ELI) report indicates that during the
past several years states have actively fulfilled their role as
laboratories in the specific context of remediating contaminated
sites."u Forty-nine states (all but Nebraska) "have their own site
cleanup programs using some combination of public funding and
" The approaches states have adopted vary widely: "In
liability. " 24
four separate studies completed since 1989 and another in
progress, [ELI] has unearthed a wide variety of approaches used
by state superfund programs around the country. " "'
The authors of the ELI report reach two conclusions
regarding creativity in state superfund programs that are salient
here. First, the reason for the variety and creativity of state
approaches to remediating hazardous waste sites is that Superfund
has not been a "delegated" program; instead, states have been free
to "adopt their own strategies for cleanup of the sites not handled
by the EPA." 26 Second, this federal approach of allowing state
experimentation has produced significant dividends. States have
produced numerous cleanups of contaminated sites. In addition, in

122. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (ACIR), PUB. No. A-98, THE
QUESTION OF STATE GOVERNMENT CAPABILITY 22 (Jan. 1985) ("Long called the
'laboratories of democracy,' states today are making a reality of this text-book
[States] undertake innovations in order to solve the different
description ....
problems they face. Such initiatives broaden the scope of choices for
policymakers at all levels and enable small scale testing of untried programs
and procedures."); PAUL PORTNEY, PUBLIC POLIcIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 283 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection As A Learning
Experience, 27 LoY. L REV. 791, 800-01 (1994) (recommending increased delegation of environmental regulatory authority to states).
123. James M. McElfish, Jr. & John Pendergrass, Reauthorizing Superfund:
Lessons From the States (Envtl. L Inst.), Research Brief no. 2 (Dec. 1993), at
4.
124. Id. at 3.
125. Id. at 4. These studies are listed infra note 38.
126. Id. As the authors point out, in this sense Superfund is unlike most
federal pollution statutes, in which Congress and EPA establish most of the acceptable parameters and processes, with interested and capable states being
"delegated" authority to administer these statutes. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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terms of national policy making, "[tihese state programs provide
useful lessons for federal legislators interested in examining
alternatives to the existing Superfund law and federal administrators looking for ways to make the law work better."" Alan
Williams, an Assistant Attorney General from Minnesota active in
Superfund matters, also lauds the benefits of a structure that
allows state creativity, concluding that many states "often can act
more quickly and efficiently than their federal counterparts" and
many have response programs that are "ahead of EPA.""
Despite the benefits that this decentralized approach to
Superfund remediation has produced, the SRA dramatically
curtails state flexibility; it appears to contemplate that states will
be delegated authority to take the lead at federal Superfund sites
only if they first agree to give up their independence and abandon
their own approaches to remediation. Instead, they effectively
must agree to act as "EPA clones." As noted above, for example,
the SRA would require states that are interested in handling
remediation of federal NPL sites, as a condition for being
delegated authority to select remedial actions, to "agree to select
such remedial actions in accordance with all of the procedures
and requirements set forth in sections 113, 117, and 121 of this
Act, the national contingency plan, and any other relevant
regulations and guidelines adopted by the Administrator.""
Similarly, section 127 requires states, in order to be delegated
authority to conduct allocations, to follow the same procedures
that EPA would follow if it were in the lead."a
Mandating "process conformity" is inconsistent with one of
the abiding principles of good government enunciated in the
National Performance Review, that of measuring results rather
than adherence to process. As the Review puts it: "Effective,
entrepreneurial governments cast aside red tape, shifting from

127. McElfish & Pendergrass, supra note 123, at 4. In particular, they
learned "two basic kinds of lessons:" "First, there are approaches pioneered by
the states that . . . could improve the federal program ....
Second, there are
experiments tried by the states that ...
should not be adopted . .. ." Id. As

Professor Farber notes, both types of lessons help to inform federal environmental policy. Farber, supra note 122, at 801.
128. Williams Testimony, supra note 39, at 4. See also id. at 10.
129. SRA, supra note 5, § 201(a), at 2-6 (creating CERCLA § 127(d)).
130. Id. at 2-6 (creating CERCLA § 127(d)).
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systems in which people are accountable for following rules to
systems in which they are accountable for achieving results." 3'
The Review logically concludes: "Our path is clear: We must shift
from systems that hold people accountable for process to systems
that hold them accountable for results. " " EPA Administrator
Browner recently made the same point in the specific context of
environmental policy: "Federal environmental laws need to be
amended to give states greater latitude to choose how they will go
about meeting federal standards for protecting health and the
environment. We must allow for flexibility, innovation and
common sense....
By requiring states to adhere rigidly to EPA process, the SRA
is likely to have the opposite effect. The SRA's "straightiacket"
approach almost inevitably will discourage "entrepreneurial"
activity at the state level-it will stifle rather than encourage innovation." Such an approach seems particularly inappropriate
here given the value that state creativity already has added to the
national remediation effort, and because to be delegated remedial
selection authority a state first must demonstrate its track record
in successfully addressing such sites."
This SRA-imposed symmetry is likely to be particularly unfortunate because of the probability that it will stifle state creativity
not only with respect to federal Superfund sites but also with
respect to the state activity at the thousands of other sites that
states address on their own. States are not likely to maintain two
different Superfund programs, one for NPL sites and one for nonNPL sites. Consequently, to the extent that states are interested in
and believe that it is important for them to take the lead at NPL
sites, their doing so will jeopardize such states' continued use of
creative approaches that already have proven effective." Such

131. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 6.

132. Id. at 13. The National Performance Review quotes with approval from
General George S. Patton to make the point: "Never tell people how to do
things. Tell them what you want to achieve, and they will surprise you with
their ingenuity." Id. at 12.
133. General Policy: Broumer Says States Need More Latitude to Meet Federal Environmental Standards, 25 Environment Reporter (BNA) 1726, 1726
(Feb. 4, 1984).
134. Id.
135. SRA, supra note 5, § 201(a), at 2-2 (creating CERCLA § 127(a)(3)).
136. See materials cited supra note 38.
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an approach almost certainly also will inhibit continued experimentation at the state level. Thus, the SRA is likely to greatly
curtail the states' continuing in their current, productive role as
"innovation centers."
An approach that is far more consistent than the SRA's with
the reinventing government principles and that seems workable
politically is to allow states the flexibility at least to "innovate
around the statute." It has been reported widely that the SRA is
the product of a delicate compromise among its various constituencies, including the environmental community and business
interests.'37 Allowing states to handle sites without requiring
adherence to these carefully negotiated statutory approaches
undoubtedly would disrupt this compromise. States would be
required, as a condition of delegation, to commit to follow the
SRA's remedy selection model and its allocation process, among
other provisions. Advancing the reinventing government principles
of empowerment, encouraging creativity, and a focus on results,
not process, by giving the states the flexibility to decide how best
to meet these statutory benchmarks of performance, would not
seem to threaten this fragile compromise and appears to be a
change worth making."
VI. CONCLUSION

The Clinton Administration's recently issued reinventing government reports embrace a number of fundamental principles of
"good governance," including minimizing redundancy, empowering
front lines personnel, and encouraging creativity in resolving
problems. Probably because of an underlying lack of confidence in
state capability, among other reasons, the SRA does little to
further the realization of these reinventing government principles
in its treatment of intergovernmental relations. Instead, its structure directly undercuts these principles by 1) requiring "dual
masters" at state-lead sites through its insistence on substantial
federal involvement in those sites; 2) establishing a new allocation

137. Superfund: Committee Action on Superfund to Precede Markup of
CWA Rewrite Measure, Chairman Says, 25 Environment Reporter (BNA) 435,
435 (July 1, 1994).

138. One state observer recently made a similar proposal to Congress. Wil-

liams Testimony, supra note 39, at 6, 10.
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process that likely will exacerbate the degree of duplication that
occurs under CERCLA by requiring state, EPA and DOJ review of
allocation decisions; 3) retaining enforcement and settlement
provisions that cede little autonomy to states (or to EPA when it
is the primary agency responsible for a site), but instead make
these agencies dependent in most instances on DOJ review and
buy-in before they can act; 4) inherently impeding a state's efforts
when EPA has delegated the state responsibility for a site by
withholding from the state access to a major tool that the SRA
gives to EPA, section 106 injunctive authority; and 5) requiring
states not only to meet national environmental goals but also
slavishly to follow national procedures in doing so.
As I note at the outset, the ultimate irony is that the SRA is
the first legislative vehicle available in the environmental arena for
the Administration and Congress to apply at the statutory level the
recently articulated reinventing government principles. Because of
the consensus dissatisfaction with the Superfund program, the
opportunity appears especially ripe to make dramatic changes that
ensure that the new law embodies these principles. The conclusion to the National Performance Review provides: "Unlike many
past efforts to change the government, the National Performance
Review will not end with the publication of a report."1' It
continues that, instead, the Review's aim is that the reinventing
government efforts will "succeed in planting a seed," referring to
Henry David Thoreau's statement that "[tihough I do not believe
that a plant will spring up where no seed has been, I have great
faith in a seed. Convince me that you have a seed there, and I am
prepared to expect wonders." 4 ' The SRA's approach to intergovernmental relations suggests that, if the National Performance
Review and related efforts have planted such a seed, it has not yet
found a sufficiently fertile environment in the legislative process
in which to sprout.

139. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 121.
140. Id.

